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Abstract
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such
as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residen-
cies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and work-
ers market. In all these markets, externalities such as complementarities
and peer effects severely complicate the preference ordering of each agent.
Further, research has shown that externalities lead to serious problems
for market stability and for developing efficient algorithms to find sta-
ble matchings. In this paper we make the observation that peer effects
are often the result of underlying social connections, and we explore a
formulation of the many-to-one matching market where peer effects are
derived from an underlying social network. The key feature of our model
is that it captures peer effects and complementarities using utility func-
tions, rather than traditional preference ordering. With this model and
considering a weaker notion of stability, namely two-sided exchange sta-
bility, we prove that stable matchings always exist and characterize the
set of stable matchings in terms of social welfare. We also give distributed
algorithms that are guaranteed to converge to a two-sided exchange stable
matching. To assess the competitive ratio of these algorithms and to more
generally characterize the efficiency of matching markets with externali-
ties, we provide general bounds on how far the welfare of the worst-case
stable matching can be from the welfare of the optimal matching, and
find that the structure of the social network (e.g. how well clustered the
network is) plays a large role.
∗This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grants CCF-
0729203, CNS-0932428 and CCF-1018927, by the Office of Naval Research under the MURI
grant N00014-08-1-0747, and by Caltech’s Lee Center for Advanced Networking.
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1 Introduction
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous forms, such as college admis-
sions, the national medical residency program, freshman housing assignment, as
well as the classic firms-and-workers market. These markets are widely studied
in academia and also widely deployed in practice, and have been applied to
other areas, such as FCC spectrum allocation and supply chain networks [5, 28]
In the conventional formulation, matching markets consist of two sets of
agents, such as medical interns and hospitals, each of which have preferences
over the agents to which they are matched. In such settings it is important that
matchings are ‘stable’ in the sense that agents do not have incentive to change
assignments after being matched. The seminal paper on matching markets was
by Gale and Shapley [18], and following this work an enormous literature has
grown, e.g., [26, 34, 35, 36] and the references therein. Further, variations on
Gale and Shapley’s original algorithm for finding a stable matching are in use
by the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), which matches medical
school graduates to residency positions at hospitals [33].
However, there are problems with many of the applications of matching
markets in practice. For example, couples participating in the NRMP often
reject their matches and search outside the system. In housing assignment
markets where college students are asked to list their preferences over housing
options, there is often collusion among friends to list the same preference order
for houses. These two examples highlight that ‘peer effects’, whether just couples
or a more general set of friends, often play a significant role in many-to-one
matchings. That is, agents care not only where they are matched, but also which
other agents are matched to the same place. Similarly, ‘complementarities’ often
play a role on the other side of the market. For example, hospitals and colleges
care not only about which individual students are assigned to them, but also
that the group has a certain diversity, e.g., of different specializations.
As a result of the issues highlighted above, there is a growing literature
studying many-to-one matchings with externalities (i.e., peer effects and com-
plementarities) [12, 19, 24, 25, 29, 31, 4, 13, 37] and the research has found that
designing matching mechanisms is significantly more challenging when exter-
nalities are considered, e.g. incentive compatible mechanism design is no longer
possible. In fact, even determining the existence of stable matchings in the
presence of externalities has been difficult.
The reason for the difficulty is that there is no longer a guarantee that a
stable many-to-one matching will exist when agents care about more than their
own matching [33, 35], and, if a stable matching does exist, it can be com-
putationally difficult to find [32]. Consequently, most research has focused on
identifying when stable matchings do and do not exist. Papers have proceeded
by constraining the matching problem through restrictions of the possible pref-
erence orderings, [12, 19, 24, 25, 29, 31], and by considered variations on the
standard notion of stability [4, 13, 37]. Our paper also considers a restriction of
the model, described in the following.
The key idea of this paper is that peer effects are often the result of an un-
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derlying social network. That is, when agents care about where other agents
are matched, it is often because they are friends. With this in mind, we con-
struct a model in Section 2 that includes a weighted, undirected social network
graph and allows agents to have utilities (which implicitly defines their prefer-
ence ordering) that depend on where neighbors in the graph are assigned. The
model is motivated by [4], which also considers peer effects defined by a so-
cial network but focuses on one-sided matching markets rather than two-sided
matching markets.
We focus on two-sided exchange-stable matchings – see Section 2 for a de-
tailed definition. We note that compared to the traditional notion of stability
of [18], this is a distinct notion of stability, but one that is relevant to many
situations where agents can compare notes with each other, such as the housing
assignment or medical matching problem. For example, in [4, 5, 16], “pairwise-
stability” is considered since they consider models where agents exchange offices
or licenses in FCC spectrum auctions. Further, consider a situation where two
hospital interns prefer to exchange the hospitals allocated to them by the NRMP.
If this is a traditional stable matching, the hospitals would not allow the swap,
even though the interns are highly unsatisfied with the match. Such a situation
has been documented in [21], and has led to a similar type of stability, exchange
stability, as defined in [1, 9, 10, 21].
Given our model of peer effects, the focus of the paper is then on charac-
terizing the set of two-sided exchange-stable matchings. Our results concern (i)
the existence of two-sided exchange-stable matchings, (ii) algorithms for finding
two-sided exchange-stable matchings, and (iii) the efficiency of exchange-stable
matchings (in terms of social welfare).
With respect to the existence of stable matchings (Section 3), it is not diffi-
cult to show that in our model two-sided exchange-stable matchings always exist.
Further, if students value houses according to the same rules, the matching that
maximizes social welfare is guaranteed to be two-sided exchange-stable. Given
the contrast to the negative results that are common for many-to-one match-
ings, e.g., [13, 32, 33], these results are perhaps surprising. Further, the results
on characterizing the existence of stable matchings naturally suggest two simple
algorithms for finding stable matchings, which we discuss in Section 4.
With respect to the efficiency of exchange-stable matchings (Section 5), re-
sults are not as easy to obtain. In this context, we limit our focus to one-sided
matching markets, but as a result we are able to attain bounds on the ratio
of the welfare of the optimal matching to that of the worst stable matching,
i.e., the ‘price of anarchy’. We also demonstrate cases where our bounds are
tight. When considering only one-sided markets, our model becomes similar to
hedonic coalition formation, but with several key differences, as highlighted in
Section 5. Our results (Theorems 5 and 6) show that the price of anarchy does
not depend on the number of, say, interns, but does grow with the number of,
say, hospitals – though the growth is typically sublinear. Further, we observe
that the impact of the structure of the social network on the price of anarchy
happens only through the clustering of the network, which is well understood in
the context of social networks, e.g., [22, 39]. Finally, it turns out that the price
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of anarchy has a dual interpretation in our context; in addition to providing a
bound on the inefficiency caused by enforcing exchange-stability, it turns out to
also provide a bound on the loss of efficiency due to peer effects.
2 Model and notation
To begin, we define the model we use to study many-to-one matchings with peer
effects and complementarities. There are four components to the model, which
we describe in turn: (i) basic notation for discussing matchings; (ii) the model
for agent utilities, which captures both peer effects and complementarities; (iii)
the notion of stability we consider; and (iv) the notion of social welfare we
consider.
To provide a consistent language for discussing many-to-one matchings,
throughout this paper we use the setting of matching incoming undergradu-
ate students to residential houses. In this setting many students are matched
to each house, and the students have preferences over the houses, but also have
peer effects as a result of wanting to be matched to the same house as their
friends. Similarly, the houses have preferences over the students, but there are
additional complementarities due to goals such as maintaining diversity. It is
clear that some form of stability is a key goal of this “housing assignment”
problem.
Notation for many-to-one matchings Using the language of the housing
assignment problem, we define two finite and disjoint sets, H = {h1, . . . , hm}
and S = {s1, . . . , sn} denoting the houses and students, respectively. For each
house, there exists a positive integer quota qh which indicates the number of
positions a house has to offer. The quota for each house may be different.
A matching µ describes the assignment of students to houses such that stu-
dents are matched to only one house, while houses are matched to multiple
students. More formally:
Definition 1. A matching is a subset µ ⊆ S × H such that |µ(s)| = 1 and
|µ(h)| = qh, where µ(s) = {h ∈ H : (s, h) ∈ µ} and µ(h) = {s ∈ S : (s, h) ∈ µ}.1
Note that we use µ2(s) to denote the set of student s’s housemates (students
also in house µ(s)).
Friendship network The friendship network among the students is modeled
by a weighted graph, G = (V,E,w) where V = S and the relationships between
students are represented by the weights of the edges connecting nodes. The
strength of a relationship between two students s and t is represented by the
weight of that edge, denoted by w(s, t) ∈ R+ ∪ {0}. We require that the graph
is undirected, i.e., the adjacency matrix is symmetric so that w(s, t) = w(t, s)
for all s, t.
1If the number of students in µ(h), say r, is less than qh, then µ(h) contains qh− r “holes”
– represented as students with no friends and no preference over houses.
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Additionally, we define a few metrics quantifying the graph structure and
its role in the matching. Let the total weight of the graph be denoted by |E| :=
1
2
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈S w(s, t). Further, let the weight of edges connecting houses h and g
under matching µ be denoted by Ehg(µ) :=
∑
s∈µ(h)
∑
t∈µ(g) w(s, t). Note that
in the case of edges within the same house Ehh(µ) :=
1
2
∑
s∈µ(h)
∑
t∈µ(h) w(s, t).
Finally, let the weight of edges that are within the houses of a particular match-
ing µ be denoted by Ein(µ) :=
∑
h∈H Ehh(µ).
Agent utility functions In our model, each agent derives some utility from
a particular matching and an agent (student or house) always strictly prefers
matchings that give a strictly higher utility and is indifferent between matchings
that give equal utility. This setup differs from the traditional notion of ‘prefer-
ence orderings’ [18, 35], but is not uncommon [2, 4, 5, 7, 16]. It is through the
definitions of the utility functions that we model peer effects (for students) and
complementarities (for houses).
Under our model, students derive benefit both from (i) the house they are
assigned to and (ii) their peers that are assigned to the same house. We model
each house h as having an desirability of Dsh ∈ R+∪{0} for student s. A similar
model was first used in [4] and is meant to capture the physical characteristics of
the house (amenities, size, etc.) with Dsh as well as peer effects. If D
s
h = D
t
h ∀s 6=
t (objective desirability), this value can be seen as representing something like
the U.S. News college rankings or hospital rankings – something that all students
would agree on. This leads to a utility for student s under matching µ of
Us(µ) := D
s
µ(s) +
∑
t∈µ2(s)
w(s, t) (1)
where w(s, t) is the weight of the edge between s and t in the friendship graph
and Dsh is utility derived by student s for house h, so that the total utility that
a student derives from a match is a combination of how “good” a house is as
well as how many friends they will have in that house.23
Similarly, the utility of a house h under matching µ is modeled by
Uh(µ) := D
h
µ(h), (2)
where Dhσ denotes the desirability of a particular set of students σ for house h
(the utility house h derives from being matched to the set of students σ). Note
that this definition of utility allows general phenomena such as heterogeneous
house preferences over groups of students.
Two-sided exchange stability Under the traditional definition of stability,
if a student and a house were to prefer each other to their current match (forming
2We note that the utility of any “holes” (such as what happens when a house’s quota is
not met), is simply Us(µ) = 0.
3Note also that if we remove Dh from the utility function and allow unlimited quotas, the
matching problem becomes the coalitional affinity game from [7].
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a blocking pair), the student is free to move to the preferred house and the house
is free to evict (if necessary) another student to make space for the preferred
student. In our model, however, we assume that students and houses cannot
“go outside the system” and leave the university (neither can students remain
unmatched), like what medical students and hospitals do when they operate
outside of the NRMP. As a result, we restrict ourselves to considering swaps of
students between houses, similar to [4, 5, 16].
To define exchange stability, it is convenient to first define a swap matching
µts in which students s and t switch places while keeping all other students’
assignments the same.
Definition 2. A swap matching µts = {µ \ {(s, h), (t, g)}} ∪ {(s, g), (t, h)}.
Note that the agents directly involved in the swap are the two students
switching places and their respective houses – all other matchings remain the
same. Further, one of the students involved in the swap can be a “hole” rep-
resenting an open spot, thus allowing for single students moving to available
vacancies. When two actual students are involved, this type of swap is a two-
sided version of the “exchange” considered in [1, 9, 10, 21] – two-sided exchange
stability requires that houses approve the swap. As a result, while an exchange-
stable matching may not exist in either the marriage or roommate problem, we
show in Section 3 that a two-sided exchange-stable matching will always exist
for the housing assignment problem.
Definition 3. A matching µ is two-sided exchange-stable (2ES) if and
only if there does not exist a pair of students (s, t) such that:
(i) ∀ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)}, Ui(µts) ≥ Ui(µ) and
(ii) ∃ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)} such that Ui(µts) > Ui(µ)
This definition implies that a swap matching in which all agents involved are
indifferent is two-sided exchange-stable. This avoids looping between equivalent
matchings. Note that the above definition implies that if two students want to
switch between two houses (or a single student wants to “switch” with a hole),
the houses involved must “approve” the swap or if two houses want to switch
two students, the students involved must agree to the swap (a hole will always
be indifferent). This is natural for the house assignment problem and many
other many-to-one matching markets, but would be less appropriate for some
other settings, such as the college-admissions model.
Social welfare One key focus of this paper is to develop an understanding
of the “efficiency loss” that results from enforcing stability of assignments in
matching markets. We measure the efficiency loss in terms of the “social wel-
fare”, which we define as follows:
W (µ) :=
∑
s∈S
Us(µ) +
∑
h∈H
Uh(µ)
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Using this definition of social welfare, the efficiency loss can be quantified
using the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS). Specifically, the
PoA (PoS) is the ratio of the optimal social welfare over all matchings, not
necessarily stable, to the minimum (maximum) social welfare over all stable
matchings. Understanding the PoA and PoS is the focus of Section 5.
3 Existence of stable matchings
We begin by focusing on the existence of two-sided exchange stable matchings.
In most prior work, matching markets with externalities do not have guaranteed
existence of a stable matching. For example, in the presence of couples on the
resident side of the hospital matching market, the NRMP algorithm may fail to
have a stable outcome [33, 35], and even if a stable matching does exist, it may
be NP-hard to find [32].
In contrast to the prior literature discussed above, we prove that a two-sided
exchange stable matching always exists in the model considered in this paper.
We begin by proposing a potential function Φ(µ) for the matching game:
Φ(µ) =
∑
h∈H
Uh(µ) +
∑
s∈S
Dsµ(s) +
1
2
∑
s∈S
 ∑
x∈µ2(s)
w(s, x)
 (3)
Due to the symmetry of the social network, every approved swap will result
in a strict increase of the potential function. Specifically,
Lemma 1. Any swap matching µts for which
(i) ∀ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)}, Ui(µts) ≥ Ui(µ), and
(ii) ∃ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)} with Ui(µts) > Ui(µ)
has Φ(µts) > Φ(µ).
Detailed proofs of this lemma and the following results are shown in Ap-
pendix A. Expanding on this idea, it is easy to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. All local maxima of Φ(µ) are two-sided exchange stable.
As there is a finite set of matches, this results in the existence of a two-sided
exchange stable matching for every housing assignment market.
If we assume that there are no vacancies in any of the houses and students
value houses according to the same rules (i.e., Dsh = D
t
h ∀ s 6= t), then each each
approved swap will result in a strict increase in the social welfare. Specifically,
Lemma 3. If house quotas are exactly met and Dsh = D
t
h ∀ s 6= t, then any
swap matching µts for which
(i) ∀ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)}, Ui(µts) ≥ Ui(µ), and
(ii) ∃ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)} with Ui(µts) > Ui(µ)
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has W (µts) > W (µ).
As before, it is now easy to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. If house quotas are exactly met and Dsh = D
t
h ∀ s 6= t, all local
maxima of W (µ) are two-sided exchange stable.
Note that this implies that the maximally efficient matching will be two-sided
exchange-stable.4
Note, however, that not all two-sided exchange-stable matchings are local
maxima of Φ(µ) or W (µ). Such a case arises when one student, for example,
refuses a swap as her utility would decrease, but the other student involved
stands to benefit a great deal from such a swap. If the swap were forced, the
total potential function (or social welfare) could increase, but only at the expense
of the first student.
The contrast between Theorem 2 and the results such as [33] and [35] can
be explained by considering a few aspects of the model we study. In particular,
we are using a distinct type of stability appropriate to our housing assignment
market. Further, the assumption that the social network graph is symmetric
are key to guaranteeing existence.
4 Finding stable matchings
In the previous section we have shown that a two-sided exchange-stable match-
ing will always exist and, moreover, that under certain assumptions, socially
optimal matchings are two-sided exchange-stable. In this section, we turn to the
task of developing algorithms for finding two-sided exchange-stable matchings.
In particular, two natural algorithms follow immediately from our analysis. For
simplicity, in this section we will assume the conditions of Theorem 4; namely,
that quotas are exactly met and students rate houses according to the same
rules.5
Algorithm 1 (Greedy)
while i ≤ maxIterations do
Search for “approved” swap µts
µ← µts
i← i+ 1
end while
Algorithm 1 proceeds by greedily considering “approved” swaps among stu-
dents/houses that improve the social welfare. Note that this algorithm can
4Note that a local maximum of W (µ) is a matching µ for which there exists no matching
µ′ which is obtained from µ by swapping the assignment of exactly two students (or a student
and an empty spot) and has W (µ′) > W (µ).
5We note that the results of this section extend to the more general case, using the potential
function defined in Section 3 rather than the social welfare function.
8
easily be implemented in a distributed manner, and loosely models the process
by which individuals adjust a matching that is not stable.
Lemma 3 and Theorem 2 immediately give that this algorithm will con-
verge to a two-sided exchange-stable matching, since the social welfare strictly
improves with each iteration, and all local maxima of W are two-sided exchange-
stable matchings. Note that Algorithm 1 is not guaranteed to converge to the
socially optimal stable matching; it will likely find just a local maxima of W .
Also, note that each iteration of the algorithm above can involve searching many
pairs of students (and houses) for an “approved” swap.
The second algorithm we consider again seeks to optimize W , this time using
a MCMC heat bath. In this algorithm we start with a random initial matching
and at each iteration swap a random pair of students with a probability that
depends on the change in social welfare: a positive change yields a probability
of swapping larger than 1/2 and vice–versa. Algorithm 2 therefore can emerge
from a local maximum. The algorithm keeps track of the “best” matching found
so far, even as it moves to worse matchings. If Algorithm 2 is run sufficiently
long (perhaps exponential time) it can find the optimal two-sided exchange-
stable matching [20]. However, there is no guarantee that the best matching
encountered in finite time is even two-sided exchange-stable, a situation that
can be remedied by applying the greedy algorithm to this matching. Simulation
results show the superiority of Algorithm 2 to Algorithm 1 in terms of welfare,
at the expense of an increase in the number of computations.
Algorithm 2 MCMC
while i ≤ maxIterations do
Pick random pair of students {s, t}
PT =
1
1+e−T (W (µts)−W (µ))
µ← µts with probability PT
if (W (µts) > Wbest) then
Wbest = W (µ
t
s)
end if
i← i+ 1
end while
To illustrate the performance of these two natural algorithms, we use two
social network data sets.
The first data set is from the Caltech Project [15]. This data set is an
undirected graph representing the friendship links among the undergraduates
at the California Institute of Technology in 2010. It includes approximately
900 nodes and 3500 edges. To illustrate the algorithms, we created 10 houses
and assigned them desirability values uniformly distributed from 0 to 10. For
the other side of the market, each student is assigned a score by each house,
uniformly distributed from 0 to 10. Each algorithm is run using the same initial
values, and the results are shown in Figure 1.
The second data set we use is from voting records for admin promotion at
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Figure 1: Illustration of the performance of Algorithms 1 and 2 on the Caltech
Social Network
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Figure 2: Illustration of the performance of Algorithms 1 and 2 on the Wikipedia
Voting network
Wikipedia. Edges in the dataset represent votes for or against a user by another
user. For simplicity, we treated the directed graph as undirected, resulting in
approximately 7000 nodes and 100000 edges. To illustrate the algorithms, we
created 71 houses and assigned them uniform random values between 0 and 10
as before. For the other side of the market, each users is assigned a score by
each house, uniformly distributed from 0 to 10, also as before. Each algorithm
is run using the same initial values, and the results are shown in Figure 2.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that with both networks, Algorithm 2 has longer
running time than Algorithm 1, which converges quickly.6 The y-axis in all
figures shows the social welfare of the matching at each iteration. As expected,
Algorithm 1 converges to a sub-optimal matching for both networks, but this
value is of the same order of magnitude as that found by Algorithm 2.
6We note that in the greedy algorithm, an “iteration” can take much more time to complete
than one “iteration” of the MCMC heat bath. Even with this effect, however, the MCMC
takes longer than the greedy algorithm.
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5 Efficiency of stable matchings
To this point, we have focused on the existence of two-sided exchange-stable
matchings and how to find them. In this section our focus is on the “efficiency
loss” due to stability in a matching market and the role peer effects play in this
efficiency loss.
We measure the efficiency loss in a matching market using the price of stabil-
ity (PoS) and the price of anarchy (PoA) as defined in Section 2. Interestingly,
the price of anarchy has multiple interpretations in the context of this paper.
First, as is standard, it measures the worst-case loss of social welfare that re-
sults due to enforcing exchange-stability. For example, the authors in [2] bound
the loss in social welfare caused by individual rationality (by enforcing stable
matchings) for matching markets without externalities. Second, it provides a
competitive ratio for Algorithm 1 for finding a stable matching, since Algo-
rithm 1 provides no guarantee about which stable matching it will find. Third,
we show later that the price of anarchy also has an interpretation as capturing
the efficiency lost due to peer effects.
The results in this section all require one additional simplifying assumption
to our model: complementarities are ignored and only peer effects are consid-
ered. Specifically, we assume, for all of our PoA results, Uh(µ) = 0, and thus
W (µ) =
∑
s∈S Us(µ). Under this assumption, the market is one-sided, with only
students participating– as a result we are only considering exchange-stability.
This assumption is limiting, but there are still many settings within which the
model is appropriate. Two examples are the housing assignment problem in the
case when students can swap positions without needing house approval, and the
assignment of faculty to offices as discussed in [4], as clearly the offices have no
preferences over which faculty occupy them. In order to simplify the analysis,
we also make use of the assumptions in Theorem 4 : (i) Dsh = D
t
h ∀ s 6= t and
(ii) house quotas are exactly met.
5.1 Related models
When the housing assignment problem is restricted to a one-sided market involv-
ing only students, we note that it becomes very similar to both (i) a hedonic
coalition formation game with symmetric additively separable preferences, as
described in [6], and (ii) a coalitional affinity game, as described in [7].
In hedonic coalition formation games, agents’ preferences for a given coalition
are based on the other members of that coalition [11]. Note that coalition games
are necessarily one-sided – agents care about the coalitions but the coalitions
cannot care about the agents. The most related work to ours in this area is [6],
where the authors show that when agents’ preferences over coalition are sym-
metric and additively separable (as the student utility functions in the housing
assignment problem are), a Nash (and individually) stable coalition structure
will always exist. This mimics the existence result proved in Section 3, however
our result applies for a two-sided market. Further work on hedonic games looks
at the complexity of finding stable coalition structures; see [3, 8, 14, 17, 27] for
11
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Figure 3: Arbitrarily bad exchange-stable matching
examples.
Coalitional affinity games consider the pairwise relationships between agents,
as represented by a weighted graph [7], and are a special subclass of hedonic
games. The most related result to the current work is [7], which proves a tight
upper bound on the Price of Anarchy using the notion of core stability7 when
the weighted graph is symmetric.
While the one-sided housing assignment problem and hedonic coalition for-
mation games appear to be very similar, there are a number of key differences.
Most importantly, the housing assignment problem considers a fixed number of
houses with a limited number of spots available; students cannot break away
and form a new coalition/house, nor can a house have more students than its
quota. In addition, our model considers exchange-stability, which is closest to
the Nash stability of [6], but is still significantly different in that it involves a
pair of students willing and able to swap. Finally, each student gains utility
from the house they are matched with, in addition to the other members of
that house, which is different from the original formulation of hedonic coalition
games.
5.2 Discussion of results
To begin the discussion of our results, note that, as discussed in Section 3,
the price of stability is 1 for our model because any social welfare optimizing
matching is stable.
However, the price of anarchy can be much larger than 1. In fact, depend-
ing on the social network, the price of anarchy can be unboundedly large, as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 1 (Unbounded price of anarchy). Consider a matching market with
4 students and 2 houses, each with a quota of 2, and two possible matchings
illustrated by Figure 3. As shown in Figure 3 (a) and (b), respectively, in the
optimal matching µ∗, W (µ∗) = k; whereas there exists a exchange-stable match-
ing with W (µ) = 2. Thus, as k increases, the price of anarchy grows linearly in
k.
7A coalition structure is core stable if no set of agents can break away and form a new
coalition to improve their own utility.
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Despite the fact that, in general, there is a large efficiency loss that results
from enforcing exchange-stability, in many realistic cases the efficiency loss is
actually quite small. The following two theorems provide insight into such cases.
A key parameter in these theorems is γ∗m which captures how well the social
network can be “clustered” into a fixed number of m groups and is defined as
follows.
γm(µ) :=
Ein(µ)
|E| (4)
γ∗m := max
µ
γm(µ) (5)
Thus, γ∗m represents the maximum edges that can be captured by a partition
satisfying the house quotas. Note that γ∗m is highly related to other clustering
metrics, such as the conductance [23], [38] and expansion [30].
We begin by noting that due to the assumption that
∑
h∈H Uh(µ) = 0, we
can separate the social welfare function into two components:
W (µ) =
∑
s∈S
Us(µ) =
∑
h∈H
∑
s∈µ(h)
Dh + ∑
t∈µ(h)
w(s, t)
 = 2Ein(µ) + ∑
h∈H
qhDh.
Thus,
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stableW (µ)
=
Q+ maxµ γm(µ)
Q+ minstable µ γm(µ)
(6)
where
Q :=
∑
h∈H qhDh
2E
. (7)
Note that the parameter Q is independent of the particular matching µ.
Our first theorem regarding efficiency is for the “simple” case of unweighted
social networks with equal house quotas and/or equivalently valued houses.
Theorem 5. Let w(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} for all students s, t and let qh ≥ 2, Dh ∈
Z+ ∪ {0} for all houses h. If qh = q for all h and/or Dh = D for all h, then
min
stable µ
W (µ) ≥ maxµW (µ)
1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m
The bound in Theorem 5 is tight, as illustrated by the example below.
Example 2 (Tightness of Theorem 5). Consider a setting with m houses and
qh = mk for all h ∈ H. Students are grouped into clusters of size k > 2, as
shown for m = 3 in Figure 4. The houses have Dh = k + 1 and Dg = Di = 0.
Each student in the middle cluster in each row has k edges to the other students
outside of their cluster (but none within), as shown.
The worst-case stable exchange-matching is represented by the vertical red
lines. Note that since Dh = k+ 1, this matching is stable, even though all edges
are cut. Thus minµ stable γm(µ) = 0. The optimal matching is represented by
13
k edges
Di = 0 Dg = 0Dh = k + 1
Di = 0
Dg = 0
Dh = k + 1
k edges
k edges
k edges
k edges
k edges
Figure 4: Network that achieves PoA bound.
the horizontal blue lines in the figure; note that γ∗m = 1. To calculate the price
of anarchy, we start from equations (6) and (7) and calculate
Q =
∑
h∈H qhDh
2|E| =
mk(k + 1)
2mk(m− 1)k =
k + 1
2(m− 1)k ,
which gives,
maxµW (µ)
minstable µW (µ)
=
Q+ γ∗m
Q+ minµ stable γm(µ)
= 1 + 2(m− 1)
(
k
k + 1
)
.
Notice that as k becomes large, this approaches the bound of 1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m.
We note that the requirement qh = q for all h and/or Dh = D for all h is
key to the proof of Theorem 5 and in obtaining such a simple bound; otherwise,
Theorem 6 applies. We omit the proofs of these theorems here for brevity; see
Appendix B for the details.
Our second theorem removes the restrictions in the theorem above, at the
expense of a slightly weaker bound. Define qmax = maxh∈H qh, wmax =
maxs,t∈S w(s, t) and D∆ = minh,g∈H(Dh −Dg), assuming that the houses are
ordered in increasing values of Dh.
Theorem 6. Let w(s, t) ∈ R+ ∪ {0} for all students s, t and Dh ∈ R+ ∪ {0},
qh ∈ Z+ for all houses h, then
min
stable µ
W (µ) ≥ maxµW (µ)
1 + 2(m− 1)
(
γ∗m +
qmaxwmax
D∆
)
Though Theorem 5 is tight, it is unclear at this point whether Theorem 6 is
also tight. However, a slight modification of the above example does show that
it has the correct asymptotics, i.e., there exists a family of examples that have
price of anarchy Θ(mγ∗mqmaxwmaxD
−1
∆ ).
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Figure 5: Illustration of γ∗m and price of anarchy bounds in Theorem 5 for
Caltech and Wikipedia networks.
A first observation one can make about these theorems is that the price
of anarchy has no direct dependence on the number of students. This is an
important practical observation since the number of houses is typically small,
while the number of students can be quite large (similar phenomena hold in
many other many-to-one matching markets). In contrast, the theorems highlight
that the degree of heterogeneity in quotas, network edge weights, and house
valuations all significantly impact inefficiency.
A second remark about the theorems is that the only dependence on the
social network is through γ∗m, which measures how well the graph can be “clus-
tered” into m groups. An important note about γ∗m is that it is highly dependent
on m, and tends to shrink quickly as m grows. We give an illustration of this
effect in Figures 5a and 5b using the two social network data sets described in
Section 4. A consequence of this behavior is that the price of anarchy is not
actually linear in m in Theorems 5 and 6, as it may first appear, it turns out
to be sublinear. This is illustrated in the context of real social network data in
Figures 5c and 5d. We note that as we are increasing m, what we are in fact
doing is creating finer allowable partitions of the network.
Next, let us consider the impact of peer effects on the price of anarchy.
Considering the simple setting of Theorem 5, we see that if there were no peer
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effects, this would be equivalent to setting w(s, t) = 0 for all s, t. This would
imply that γ∗m = 0, and so the price of anarchy is one. Thus, another interpre-
tation of the price of anarchy in Theorem 5 is the efficiency lost as a result of
peer effects.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have focused on many-to-one matchings with peer effects and
complementarities. Typically, results on this topic tend to be negative, either
proving that stable matchings may not exist, e.g., [33, 35], or that stable match-
ings are computationally difficult to find, e.g., [32].
In this paper, our goal has been to provide positive results. To this end, we
focus on the case when peer effects are the result of an underlying social net-
work, and this restriction on the form of the peer effects allows us to prove that
a two-sided exchange-stable matching always exists and that socially optimal
matchings are always stable. Further, we provide bounds on the maximal inef-
ficiency (price of anarchy) of any exchange-stable matching and show how this
inefficiency depends on the clustering properties of the social network graph.
Interestingly, in our context the price of anarchy has a dual interpretation as
characterizing the degree of inefficiency caused by peer effects.
There are numerous examples of many-to-one matchings where the results in
this paper can provide insight; one of particular interest to us is the matching of
incoming undergraduates to residential houses which happens yearly at Caltech
and other universities. Currently incoming students only report a preference
order for houses, and so are incentivized to collude with friends and not reveal
their true preferences. For such settings, the results in this paper highlight the
importance of having students report not only their preference order on houses,
but also a list of friends with whom they would like to be matched. Using a
combination of these factors the algorithms and efficiency bounds presented in
this paper provide a promising approach, for this specific market as well as any
general market where peer effects change the space of stable matchings.
The results in the current paper represent only a starting point for research
into the interaction of social networks and many-to-one matchings. There are
a number of simplifying assumptions in this work which would be interesting
to relax. For example, the efficiency bounds we have proven consider only a
one-sided market, where houses do not have preferences over students, students
rate houses similarly, and quotas are exactly met. These assumptions are key
to providing simpler bounds, and they certainly are valid in some matching
markets; however relaxing these assumptions would broaden the applicability of
the work greatly.
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A Existence Proof
A.1 General case: Local maxima of Φ(µ) are two-sided
exchange-stable
To prove Theorem 2, we first prove a technical lemma (Lemma 1), from which
the theorem follows immediately. The analysis is straightforward and draws its
key ideas from the work of [4], which considers only a one-sided market rather
than the two-sided market considered here.
Proof. (Lemma 1) We begin by calculating the difference in the potential func-
tion for a swap matching using (3):
Φ(µts)− Φ(µ) =
∑
h∈H
Uh(µ
t
s)− Uh(µ) +
∑
s∈S
Dsµts(s) −D
s
µ(s)
+
1
2
∑
s∈S
 ∑
x∈µts(s)
w(s, x)
− 1
2
∑
s∈S
 ∑
x∈µ(s)
w(s, x)
 (8)
Expanding and canceling like terms, we have
Φ(µts)− Φ(µ) = Uh(µts)− Uh(µ) + Ug(µts)− Ug(µ) +Dsg −Dtg +Dth −Dsh
+
1
2
[(∑
x∈g
w(s, x)− w(s, t) +
∑
x∈h
w(t, x)− w(s, t)
)
+
(∑
x∈g
w(x, s)− w(s, t) +
∑
x∈h
w(x, t)− w(s, t)
)]
− 1
2
[(∑
x∈h
w(s, x) +
∑
x∈g
w(t, x)
)
+
(∑
x∈h
w(x, s) +
∑
x∈g
w(x, t)
)]
(9)
which becomes, due to the symmetry of the social network,
Φ(µts)− Φ(µ) = Uh(µts)− Uh(µ) + Ug(µts)− Ug(µ) +Dsg −Dtg +Dth −Dsh
+
∑
x∈g
(w(s, x)− w(t, x)) +
∑
x∈h
(w(t, x)− w(s, x))− 2w(s, t)
(10)
Note that if t is a “hole”, this becomes
Φ(µts)− Φ(µ) = Uh(µts)− Uh(µ) + Ug(µts)− Ug(µ) +Dsg −Dsh
+
∑
x∈g
(w(s, x))−
∑
x∈h
(w(s, x)) (11)
Now, consider a matching µ and a swap matching µts that satisfies (i) and
(ii) from the lemma statement. Without loss of generality, assume that student
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s strictly improves. The other student could be either a “hole” or a real student
that either improves or is indifferent to the swap. The other cases are symmetric.
Define µ(s) = h, and µ(t) = g. The change in utility for student s is then
0 < Us(µ
t
s)− Us(µ)
= Dsg −Dsh −
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(s, x) +
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(s, x)− w(s, t),
Similarly, for student t, we have
0 ≤ Ut(µts)− Ut(µ)
= Dth −Dtg −
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x) +
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)− w(s, t).
Adding the above inequalities, we obtain the following:
0 < Dsg −Dtg +Dth −Dsh +
∑
x∈µ(g)
(w(s, x)− w(t, x)) +
∑
x∈µ(h)
(w(t, x)− w(s, x))
− 2w(s, t)
:= δs,t
On the house side of the market, we have
0 ≤ Uh(µts)− Uh(µ) + Ug(µts)− Ug(µ) := ∆H
as only houses h and g are affected by the swap and the change in their utilities
is non-negative by assumption.
Thus, using (10) above, we have
Φ(µts)− Φ(µ) = ∆H + δs,t > 0. (12)
Note that this holds even if t is a “hole.”
Proof. (Theorem 2) Let matching µ be a local maximum of Φ(µ). Assume, by
way of contradiction, that µ is not two-sided exchange-stable. Lemma 1 shows
that any swap matching that is acceptable to all parties (i.e. satisfies conditions
(i) and (ii)) strictly increases Φ(µ). But this contradicts the assumption that µ
is a local maximum. Thus, µ must be two-sided exchange-stable.
As the number of matches is finite, the global maximum of the potential func-
tion must be two-sided exchange-stable, and, therefore, a two-sided exchange
stable matching will always exist.
A.2 Specific case: Local maxima of W (µ) are two-sided
exchange-stable
In this specific case, we assume that house quotas are exactly met (i.e., there
are no vacancies or “holes”) and that all students rate houses according to the
same rules (i.e., Dsh = D
t
h ∀ s 6= t).
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Proof. (Lemma 3) Consider a matching µ and a swap matching µts that satisfies
(i) and (ii) from the lemma statement. Note that due to the assumption that
the house quotas are all met, the swap must be between two students, not a
student and a “hole.” Without loss of generality, assume that student s strictly
improves. The other cases are symmetric. Define µ(s) = h, and µ(t) = g. The
change in utility for student s is then
0 < Us(µ
t
s)− Us(µ)
= Dg −Dh −
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(s, x) +
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(s, x)− w(s, t),
Similarly, for student t, we have
0 ≤ Ut(µts)− Ut(µ)
= Dh −Dg −
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x) +
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)− w(s, t).
Adding the above inequalities, we obtain the following:
0 <
∑
x∈µ(g)
(w(s, x)− w(t, x)) +
∑
x∈µ(h)
(w(t, x)− w(s, x))
− 2w(s, t)
:= δs,t
Continuing, the total change in utility for all students is:
∆S :=
∑
x∈S
Ux(µ
t
s)−
∑
x∈S
Ux(µ)
= δs,t +
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(x, s)− w(s, t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from s joining g
−
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(x, s)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss from s leaving h
+
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(x, t)− w(s, t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from t joining h
−
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(x, t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss from t leaving g
= 2δs,t (13)
> 0
where line (13) comes from the fact that we assume the social network graph is
symmetric.
On the house side of the market, we have
0 ≤ Uh(µts)− Uh(µ) + Ug(µts)− Ug(µ) := ∆H
as only houses h and g are affected by the swap and the change in their utilities
is non-negative by assumption. Thus, the total social welfare strictly increases:
W (µts)−W (µ) = ∆S + ∆H > 0
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Using Lemma 3 it is now easy to complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof. (Theorem 4) Let matching µ be a local maximum of W (µ). Lemma 3
shows that any swap matching that is acceptable to all parties (i.e. satisfies con-
ditions (i) and (ii)) strictly increases the total social welfare. But this contradicts
the assumption that µ is a local maximum. Thus, µ must be stable.
B Proofs of PoA Theorems
We note that these proofs hold for the one-sided market; i.e., when Uh(µ) =
0 ∀h ∈ H, where the quotas for the houses are exactly satisfied; i.e., there
are no “holes,” and students value houses according to the same rules; i.e.,
Dsh = D
t
h ∀ s 6= t, h ∈ H. Also note that for ease of notation, we use E instead
of |E| to represent the total edge weight of the graph in this appendix.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 5
Throughout the proof we assume that the houses are ordered: i.e., if g < h then
Dg < Dh. An important tool that we use throughout the proof is a rephrasing
of the definition of exchange stability in the one-sided market case in terms of
a function α as follows.
Definition 4. Let αµ(s, g) be a function representing the benefit a student s
gains by moving to house g under matching µ:
αµ(s, g) = Dg −Dµ(s) +
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(s, x)−
∑
x∈µ2(s)
w(s, x) (14)
Notice that using the definition above, given a specific swap matching µts
where t ∈ µ(g), we can calculate the difference in utility for the involved student
s as
Us(µ
t
s)− Us(µ) = αµ(s, g)− w(s, t)
because
∑
x∈µts(g) w(s, x) =
∑
x∈µ(g) w(s, x)− w(s, t).
The definition of α also provides a useful new phrasing of the definition of
exchange stability, which is equivalent to that of Definition 3 when the market
is one-sided, i.e, when Uh(µ) = 0 ∀h ∈ H. Note that we are only considering
the Price of Anarchy for the one-sided market here – we plan to generalize these
results for the two-sided case in future work.
Definition 5. A matching µ is exchange stable (ES) in the one-sided (students-
only) housing assignment market if and only if for all pairs of students s ∈ µ(h)
and t ∈ µ(g), at least one of the following conditions holds:
Condition 1: s doesn’t want to swap, i.e., αµ(s, g) < w(s, t).
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Condition 2: t doesn’t want to swap, i.e., αµ(t, h) < w(s, t).
Condition 3: s and t are indifferent, i.e., αµ(s, g) =
αµ(t, h) = w(s, t).
Using the above rephrasing of the definition of exchange stability, we now
continue with the proof of Theorem 5. In order to prove an upper bound on the
price of anarchy, we prove a lower bound on γm(µ) when µ is stable. To prove
this lower bound, we first prove an upper bound on the number of cross edges
(Ehg = Egh) in the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let w(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} for all students s, t and let qh ≥ 2, Dh ∈ Z+∪{0}
for all h. Let qh = q for all h and/or Dh = D for all h. If a matching µ is
stable, then for all houses h and g,
Ehg ≤ max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg) (15)
Proof. Using the conditions of stability from Definition 5 and Lemmas 11 and
12 as summarized below and proved in Appendix C, we have
Case 1: If there exists s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > 1 then, by Lemma 11, if µ
is stable it follows that
Egh ≤ qg(Dg −Dh) + 2Egg
Case 2: If there exists t ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) > 1 then, by Lemma 11, if µ
is stable it follows that
Ehg ≤ qh(Dh −Dg) + 2Ehh
Case 3: If there does not exist s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > 1 and there does
not exist t ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) > 1 then, by Lemma 12, if µ is stable it
follows that
Ehg ≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
Given any matching µ in the student-only market, it must fall into one of the
three cases above. Thus, if µ is stable, it follows that one of the three bounds
above holds. Because the edges are undirected, Ehg = Egh, we can combine the
three bounds to conclude that if µ is stable,
Ehg ≤ max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
Next, we use the above to prove a lower bound on γm(µ).
Lemma 8. Let w(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} and let qh ≥ 2, Dh ∈ Z+ ∪ {0} for all h. Let
qh = q for all h and/or Dh = D for all h. If a matching µ is stable, then
γm(µ) ≥ max
(
E −∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg)
(2m− 1)E , 0
)
(16)
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Proof.
Ein(µ) = E −
∑
g<h
Egh
≥ E −
∑
g<h
(qh(Dh −Dg) + 2(Ehh + Egg)) (17)
= E − 2(m− 1)Ein(µ)−
∑
g<h
(qh(Dh −Dg))
where we have used the assumption that the houses are ordered in line (17).
Solving for Ein(µ) gives
Ein(µ) ≥
E −∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg)
2m− 1 .
Thus,
γm(µ) =
Ein(µ)
E
≥ E −
∑
g<h qh(Dh −Dg)
(2m− 1)E .
Note that the above bound is only useful when the numerator is positive; oth-
erwise, the bound becomes negative. However, it is immediate to see that
γm(µ) ≥ 0 always, as Ein(µ) and E are non-negative, which completes the
proof.
Finally, we can complete the proof of Theorem 5 using the above lemmas.
There are two cases to consider, depending on the value of E :
Case 1: E >
∑
g>h qh(Dh −Dg)
Plugging the bound from Lemma 8 into (6) gives
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stableW (µ)
=
Q+ γ∗m
Q+ γm(µ)
≤
∑
h∈H qhDh
2E +γ
∗
m∑
h∈H qhDh
2E +
E−∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)
(2m−1)E
=
(2m−1)∑h∈H qhDh+2(2m−1)Eγ∗m
(2m−1)∑h∈H qhDh+2E−2∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)
Using Lemma 13 from the Appendix to substitute for
∑
h∈H qhDh is then
enough to complete the proof in this case, after some algebra using the fact
that γ∗m ≤ 1.
Case 2: E ≤∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg)
In this case, Lemma 8 states that γm(µ) ≥ 0. Using this bound and plugging
into (6) gives
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stableW (µ)
=
Q+ γ∗m
Q+ γm(µ)
≤ 1 + γ
∗
m
Q
(18)
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Note thatQ > 0 as long as E > 0 because we are given that E ≤∑g<h qh(Dh−
Dg) in this case. Further, note that the case of E = 0 is trivial because all
matchings have the same welfare and so the price of anarchy is 1.
Using E ≤∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg) we have
Q ≥
∑
h∈H qhDh
2
∑
g<h qh(Dh −Dg)
. (19)
Combining (18) and (19) and again using Lemma 13 from the appendix is then
enough to complete the proof in this case, after some algebra.
One final remark about this proof is that in the special case of Dh = 0 a
tighter bound holds. Specifically, the price of anarchy is bounded by (2m−1)γ∗m
in this case.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 6
The proof of Theorem 6 follows the same structure as the proof of Theorem 5,
with a few added complexities that cause the bound to become weaker.
To begin, we again derive a bound on the cross-edges.
Lemma 9. Let w(s, t) ∈ R+ ∪ {0} for all students s, t and let Dh ∈ R+ ∪ {0}
for all houses h. If a matching µ is stable, then for all houses h and g,
Ehg ≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
+ qmaxwmax.
Proof. Using the conditions of stability from Definition 5 for the one-sided mar-
ket and Lemmas 14 and 15 from Appendix C, we have three cases.
Case 1: If there exists s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > w(s, t) for all t ∈ µ(g)
then, by Lemma 14, if µ is stable, it follows that
Egh ≤ qg(Dg −Dh) + 2Egg + qgwmax.
Case 2: If there exists t ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) > w(s, t) for all s ∈ µ(h)
then, by Lemma 14, if µ is stable, it follows that
Ehg ≤ qh(Dh −Dg) + 2Ehh + qhwmax.
Case 3: If there does not exist s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > w(s, t) and there
does not exist t ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) > w(s, t), for all t ∈ µ(g), s ∈ µ(h)
respectively, then, by Lemma 15, if µ is stable, it follows that
Ehg ≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
+ qmaxwmax.
Given any matching µ, it must fall into one of the three cases above. Thus,
if µ is exchange-stable, it follows that one of the three bounds above holds.
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Because the edges are undirected, Ehg = Egh, we can combine the three bounds
to conclude that, if µ is stable,
Ehg ≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
+ qmaxwmax
Next, we use the above to prove a lower bound on γm(µ).
Lemma 10. Let w(s, t) ∈ R+ ∪ {0}. If a matching µ is stable, then
γm(µ) ≥ max
(
E−∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−(m2 )qmaxwmax
(2m−1)E , 0
)
Proof.
Ein(µ) = E −
∑
g<h
Egh
≥ E −
∑
g<h
(qh(Dh −Dg) + 2(Ehh + Egg) + qmaxwmax) (20)
= E − 2(m− 1)Ein(µ)−
∑
g<h
(qh(Dh −Dg))
−
(
m
2
)
qmaxwmax
where line (20) follows from the assumption that the houses are ordered.
Solving for Ein(µ) gives
Ein(µ) ≥ E−
∑
g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−(m2 )qmaxwmax
2m−1 ,
and thus
γm(µ) =
Ein(µ)
E
≥ E−
∑
g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−(m2 )qmaxwmax
(2m−1)E .
This bound is only relevant when E >
∑
g>h qh(Dh −Dg) +
(
m
2
)
qmaxwmax.
Otherwise, the bound becomes negative, in which case we use the fact that
γm(µ) ≥ 0 always, as Ein(µ) and E are non-negative.
Finally, we can complete the proof of Theorem 6 using the lemmas above.
There are two cases to consider, depending on the value of E.
Case 1: E >
∑
g<h qh(Dh −Dg) +
(
m
2
)
qmaxwmax
Plugging the bound from Lemma 10 into (6) gives
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
=
Q+ γ∗m
Q+ γm(µ)
≤
∑
h∈H qhDh
2E +γ
∗
m∑
h∈H qhDh
2E +
E−∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−(m2 )qmaxwmax
(2m−1)E
=
(2m−1)∑h∈H qhDh+2(2m−1)Eγ∗m
(2m−1)∑h∈H qhDh+2E−2∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−2(m2 )qmaxwmax
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Using Lemma 13 to substitute for
∑
h∈H qhDh, the bound becomes, after
some algebra,
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
≤ (1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m)×(
2(m−1)E+∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)
2(m−1)E+∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−2(m−1)(m2 )qmaxwmax
)
.
Using E ≥∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)+(m2 )qmaxwmax, we have, after some algebra,
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
≤ (1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m)
(
1 +
2(m−1)(m2 )qmaxwmax
(2m−1)∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)
)
.
Case 2: E ≤∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg) + (m2 )qmaxwmax
In this case, Lemma 10 states that γm(µ) ≥ 0. Using this bound and plugging
into (6), we have
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
=
Q+ γ∗m
Q+ γm(µ)
≤ 1 + γ
∗
m
Q
.
Using E ≤∑g<h q(Dh −Dg) + (m2 )qmaxwmax we have
Q ≥
∑
h∈H qhDh
2
∑
g<h qh(Dh −Dg) + 2
(
m
2
)
qmaxwmax
.
and so the price of anarchy becomes, again using Lemma 13,
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
≤ 1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m +
2
(
m
2
)
qmaxwmax∑
h∈H qhDh
.
We can combine the two cases into one (looser) bound,
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
≤ 1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m +
2(m− 1)qmaxwmax
D∆
.
C Technical Lemmas
This appendix includes the lemmas used in the proofs of Theorems 5 and 6.
Lemma 11. Let w(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} for all students s, t and let Dh ∈ Z+ ∪ {0} for
all h. Let µ be a stable matching. If there exists a student s ∈ µ(h) such that
αµ(s, g) > 1 for some other house g, then Egh ≤ qg(Dg −Dh) + 2Egg.
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Proof. Since µ is stable, then for all t ∈ µ(g), (s, t) must satisfy at least one of
the three conditions stated in the definition of exchange stability (Definition 5).
However, for all t ∈ µ(g),
αµ(s, g) > 1 ≥ w(s, t).
Thus, (s, t) cannot satisfy conditions 1 or 3. Therefore, it must satisfy condition
2, which implies that for all t ∈ µ(g)
αµ(t, h) < w(s, t) ≤ 1.
Since Dh, w(s, t) ∈ Z+ ∪ {0} we have that αµ(t, h) ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}, and so
αµ(t, h) < 1 =⇒ αµ(t, h) ≤ 0, ∀ t ∈ µ(g).
Summing over all t ∈ µ(g) gives∑
t∈µ(g)
αµ(t, h) ≤ 0.
Using the definition of α, we have
∑
t∈µ(g)
Dh −Dg + ∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)−
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x)
 ≤ 0.
Simplifying the above yields
qg(Dh −Dg) + Egh − 2Egg ≤ 0,
from which the desired bound follows.
Lemma 12. Let w(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} for all students s, t, and let Dh ∈ Z+ ∪{0} for
all houses h. Let µ be a stable matching and let qh = q ≥ 2 and/or Dh = D ∈
Z+ ∪{0} for all h. If (i) there does not exist an s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > 1
and (ii) there does not exists a ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) > 1, then
Ehg ≤ max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
Proof. It follows from the assumptions in the theorem statement that the stu-
dents in houses h and g can be partitioned into 6 sets based on their house and
α values (either 1, 0, or negative), as shown in Figure 6.
Let S0, S1, and S−1 denote the set of students in house h such that αµ(s, g) =
0, αµ(s, g) = 1, and αµ(s, g) ≤ −1 respectively. For convenience, we use the
same notation for the set and the number of students in the set, e.g., |S1| = S1
The same conventions apply to the T variables and students in house g. Two
sets are connected with a black line in Figure 6 if all students in one set must
be connected to all students in the other set. These connections follow from the
conditions of stability in Definition 5. This gives us 3 constraints:
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α = 0
T0
α = 1
S1
house h
α = 0
S0
α ≤ −1
S−1
α = 1
T1
house g
α ≤ −1
T−1
Figure 6: Partition of students based on α function
1. if αµ(s, g) = 1 and αµ(t, h) = 1 then w(s, t) = 1
2. if αµ(s, g) = 1 and αµ(t, h) = 0 then w(s, t) = 1
3. if αµ(s, g) = 0 and αµ(t, h) = 1 then w(s, t) = 1
These constraints give us a lower bound on the edges between houses h and
g. ∑
t∈µ(g)
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x) ≥ S1T1 + S1T0 + S0T1 (21)
To prove the theorem, we want to find an upper bound on the cross edges,
Ehg, so we relate the edges in the graph to the sum of the α values using the
definition of the α function.∑
s∈µ(h)
αµ(s, g) = qh(Dg −Dh) + Ehg − 2Ehh (22)
Since the students in each house are partitioned by their α values, we can
bound this sum as: ∑
s∈µ(h)
αµ(s, g) ≤ S1 − S−1 (23)
Combining (22) and (23) gives
Ehg ≤ qh(Dh −Dg) + 2Ehh + S1 − S−1 (24)
To continue, we need to find an upper bound on the quantity S1 − S−1. To
do this, we start by lower bounding Egg.
2Egg =
∑
t∈µ(g)
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x)
Recalling the definition of α in (14) gives∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x) = Dh −Dg +
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)− αµ(t, h).
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Combining the previous two equations yields
2Egg =
∑
t∈µ(g)
Dh −Dg + ∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)− αµ(t, h)

=qg(Dh −Dg) +
∑
t∈µ(g)
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)−
∑
t∈µ(g)
αµ(t, h).
Using inequalities (21) and (23) gives
S1T1 + S1T0 + S0T1 − (T1 − T−1) ≤ 2Egg + qg(Dg −Dh) (25)
We can now use the above to find an upper bound on S1 − S−1. To do this,
we relate the left hand side of the above inequality to S1 − S−1.
Specifically, let f(S1, S0, S−1, T1, T0, T−1) = S1T1 +S1T0 +S0T1−T1 +T−1−
(S1−S−1). It is possible to show using elementary techniques that this function
is non-negative, and thus that
S1 − S−1 ≤ S1T1 + S1T0 + S0T1 − T1 + T−1 (26)
We omit the details for brevity. Note, however that the inequality in (26) holds
only for the case where qh = q for all h ∈ H. In the case where the quotas are
not equal but Dh = D for all h ∈ H, the proof technique differs slightly, but
still yields S1 − S−1 ≤ 2Egg, from which the result follows.
Finally, combining (25) and (26) gives
S1 − S−1 ≤ S1T1 + S1T0 + S0T1 − T1 + T−1
≤ 2Egg + qg(Dg −Dh)
To complete the proof we now plug the above into (24) to get
Ehg ≤qh(Dh −Dg) + 2Ehh + 2Egg + qg(Dg −Dh)
≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg).
where the final step follows from noting that at most one of Dh−Dg and Dg−Dh
is strictly positive.
Lemma 13. ∑
g<h∈H qh(Dh −Dg)∑
h∈H qhDh
≤ m− 1
Proof. Without loss of generality assume the houses are ordered so that if g < h,
then Dg < Dh. The following inequalities hold simply because qh, qg, Dh, Dg
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are all non-negative values.∑
g<h∈H qh(Dh −Dg)∑
h∈H qhDh
≤
∑
g<h∈H(qhDh + qgDg)∑
h∈H qhDh
≤
∑
h∈H
∑
g 6=h∈H qhDh∑
h∈H qhDh
=
∑
h∈H(m− 1)qhDh∑
h∈H qhDh
= m− 1
The remaining lemmas parallel the above lemmas, but are used for proving
Theorem 6, and thus apply in more general settings.
Lemma 14. Let w(s, t) ∈ R+ ∪{0} for all students s, t, and let Dh ∈ R+ ∪{0}
for all h ∈ H. Consider a stable matching µ. If there exists an s ∈ µ(h) such
that αµ(s, g) > w(s, t) for all t ∈ µ(g), then Egh < qg(Dg−Dh)+2Egg+qgwmax.
Proof. By assumption, there exists a student in h that strictly wants to swap
with any student in house g. It then follows from the stability of µ that all
students in g must strictly oppose the swap (i.e., αµ(t, h) < w(s, t)). This gives
Dh −Dg +
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)−
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x) < w(s, t) < wmax,
for all t ∈ µ(g). Summing the above equation over t ∈ µ(g) then yields
qg(Dh −Dg) + Egh − 2Egg < qgwmax
Rearranging the previous equation completes the proof.
Lemma 15. Let w(s, t) ∈ R+ ∪{0} for all students s, t, and let Dh ∈ R+ ∪{0}
for all h ∈ H. Consider a stable matching µ. If (i) there does not exist an
s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > w(s, t) for all t ∈ µ(g) and (ii) there does not
exist t ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) > w(s, t) for all s ∈ µ(h), then
Ehg ≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh))
+ 2(Ehh + Egg) + qmaxwmax
Proof. Conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent to requiring
∀s ∈ µ(h), Dg −Dh +
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(s, x)
−
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(s, x) ≤ w(s, t) ∀t ∈ µ(g)
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and
∀t ∈ µ(g), Dh −Dg +
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)
−
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x) ≤ w(s, t) ∀s ∈ µ(h)
To complete the proof we simply sum these two bounds using w(s, t) ≤ wmax
and Egh = Ehg.
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